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Abstract 
The relational account by Robert Nozick (1981; 1989) posits meaning as engaged, external 
connection to an array of value, and it has been widely influential in debates concerning life’s meaning. 
Thaddeus Metz (2001; 2013; 2016) proffers several counterexamples to the view, arguing that it does 
not best account for what is conceptually important to meaning in life. We evaluate these criticisms, 
determining that while some objections are less persuasive, others are more compelling, particularly 
Metz’s subjectivist critique which we go on to expand in developing a novel counterexample to the 
relational view. We conclude with positing another final counterexample—a being who accrues 




In recent decades, the relational theory has been one of the most prominent 
accounts in the philosophical literature on life’s meaning. The basic notion is 
simple: meaning in life requires that one intensely connects with an array of value 
beyond oneself. It was first made popular by Robert Nozick in his two works 
Philosophical Explanations (1981) and Examined Life (1989); many have 
subsequently adopted his approach, or at least prominent features of it, as a viable 
framework for grasping meaning in life (Cooper 2003: 29-30, 132; Bennett-
Hunter 2014; Bennett-Hunter 2016: 1277; Benatar 2017: 18, 54). 
One of the most notable critics of this view is Thaddeus Metz (2001: 145-147; 
2013: 29-31; 2016). In analyzing the relational view, he makes a careful 
distinction between a conception of life’s meaning (“a theory of what makes life 
meaningful”) and the concept of a meaningful life (“what the competing 
conceptions of a meaningful life are about”) (Metz 2001: 138).1 Metz divides his 
counterexamples to Nozick’s account by what Metz takes to be strong 
formulations of a relational conception of meaning in life and a relational concept 
                                                     
* Graduate Students, Department of Philosophy, 85 Humanities Instructional Building, University of 
California, Irvine, CA 92697-4555. Email: changji1[a]uci.edu and michelst[a]uci.edu 
** Many thanks to Brad Kim and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on this paper.   
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of meaning in life (2001: 145-146; 2013: 18-21; 28-31). Specifically, he postulates 
“the idea of connecting with something valuable for its own sake beyond one’s 
person” for the former notion (Metz 2013: 28) and “the idea of connecting with 
final goods beyond one’s animal self” for the latter (Metz 2013: 29). 
We render differently a relational conception of meaning and a relational 
concept of it, as will be clear later (the terms “relational account” or “relational 
theory” encompass both these aspects). However, Metz’s counterexamples will 
be understood as applicable to our analysis of the relational view since the central 
elements of intrinsic value as ultimate terminus (for the relational conception of 
meaning) and external connection (for the relational concept of meaning) are 
common to both Metz’s and our characterizations. The focus of this paper will be 
on the aspect of external connection as it functions within Nozick’s account. In 
other words, we do not dispute that value is needed for meaning. What we 
question is whether one must connect externally to that value in order to gain 
meaning (this is also the central element that Metz’s counterexamples center on). 
Thus, even though this paper splits up a relational conception and concept of 
meaning for purposes of aligning with Metz’s delineation, the distinction will not 
be important for the rest of the paper. For our critique of the crucial aspect of 
external connection is a criticism of both the relational concept and conception of 
meaning—in other words, an objection to the relational account. 
We begin with a brief survey of Nozick’s view and go on to consider the 
merits of Metz’s objections. We then offer two primary challenges to the relational 
account: first, in comparing rival subjectivist theories, outward connections do not 
seem to be much of a factor in living a meaningful life, casting doubt on the claim 
that external relations are necessary for meaning. Second, it seems that an entity 
which makes purely internal connections is able to obtain meaning, again calling 
into question the element of outward connection that is vital to the relational 
theory.  
 
2. Nozick’s Relational Account 
 
As we interpret Nozick according to the concept/conception schema that Metz 
uses, the concept of meaning in life is inherently relational: “We can understand 
the question of something’s meaning, roughly, as the question of how it connects 
up to what is outside it” (Nozick 1981: 601). Again, Nozick writes concerning this 
concept of meaning, “To seek to give life meaning is to seek to transcend the limits 
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of one’s individual life” (Nozick 1989: 166). In other words, one must connect 
externally, not internally, in order to live a meaningful life. Admittedly, the 
internal/external distinction is somewhat vague, yet it seems that enough sense 
can be made of the idea of something being beyond one’s self in order to 
intelligibly discuss making meaning through external connections.2  
However, Nozick’s relational account does not stop there. He fleshes out this 
framework with his conception of what makes life meaningful, namely the idea 
that meaning in life requires that one strongly connects outside oneself to worth 
(Nozick 1989: 167-168). Worth is the category he classifies value and meaning 
under, although he sees value as that which primarily endows meaning, 
particularly intrinsic value (Nozick 1981: 610-613). The rationale for value’s 
primacy is that if meaning were the only aspect of worth that one could link to in 
order to acquire meaning, a regress problem would occur that would be difficult 
to stop (Nozick 1989: 167-168). This is because intrinsic meaning is hard to 
fathom given meaning’s inherently relational nature—there is always another 
connection that needs to be made in order for meaning to accrue (Nozick 1981: 
599). He writes, “We need not look beyond something to find its (intrinsic value), 
whereas we do have to look beyond a thing to discover its meaning…The regress 
of meaning is stopped by reaching something with a kind of worth other than 
meaning—namely, reaching something of value” (Nozick 1989: 167-168).3  
Regarding these outward relations, it is not mere connections that matter. 
They must be strong ones that interact in some important way (e.g. passion, 
engagement, etc.) with the non-trivial thing connected to (Nozick 1989: 168). And 
the greater the diversity of value one connects to outside oneself, the more 
meaning one accrues: “This meaning will depend upon the array of external or 
wider values connected with it and upon the nature of the connections, their 
strength, intensity, closeness…The meaning of a life is its place in a wider context 
of value” (Nozick 1981: 611). Thus, in summary of Nozick’s conception of a 
meaningful life: in order to live such a life, one must substantively link beyond 
oneself to worth—particularly, a wider context of value where intrinsic value 
ultimately grounds one’s transcendent relations toward meaning.  
One question that arises under this framework is whether one must connect to 
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3 Nozick also considers the notion of a deity as a meaning-conferring destination for linkages; ultimately, 
he thinks this schema a coherent but insufficiently plausible idea (Nozick 1981: 609). 
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intrinsic value in order to gain meaning, or whether one can link to instrumental 
value or even just another meaningful, non-intrinsically valuable entity in order 
to gain meaning. Certainly, Nozick envisions that chains of meaning must 
eventually end up with intrinsic value, otherwise the regress never stops. However, 
he still adheres to a traditional intrinsic/instrumental framework of value (along 
with some novel categories he stipulates) (Nozick 1981: 312-313). Given this 
retention, perhaps gaining meaning through instrumental value is also what he has 
in mind, such as when he writes, “Meaning is a connection with an external value, 
but this meaning need not involve any connection with an infinite value; we may 
well aspire to that, but to fall short is not to be bereft of meaning. There are many 
numbers between zero and infinity” (Nozick 1981: 610-611).  
Or consider something that is non-intrinsically valuable yet meaningful. One 
prime candidate of this sort is chess, about which Nozick states, “An example of 
value without importance is chess…By connecting up with larger themes of 
combat, games might be said to have meaning also…But the game is not, I think, 
important. It does not have any impact beyond itself, even though it is an activity 
that can dominate someone’s life” (Nozick 1989: 170-171). Nozick considers 
chess to be somewhat meaningful because it connects to themes of combat. 
Additionally, it is arguable that he sees chess as non-intrinsically valuable as well, 
since he describes it as lacking importance, “any impact beyond itself,” and 
something that fails to deepen the lives of those who participate in it (Nozick 
1989: 171)—logically consistent yet hardly fitting descriptions for something 
which is supposed to possess the highest sort of value.4 Given that one seems able 
to gain meaning by connecting to something meaningful since meaning is a 
variety of worth (it just can’t be meaning all the way down), it is plausible to think 
that meaning can be gained also by linking to something meaningful without 
intrinsic value. Thus, although intrinsic value is the ultimate foundation for 
meaning because it is the final terminus for meaningful connections, it seems that 
on the relational theory, some meaning can be gained via linkages to non-
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and the degree of unity to which that diversity is brought” (and for Nozick, something possesses intrinsic 
value “to the degree that is organically unified”) (Nozick 1989: 164).  
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3. Metz’s Objections—Possible Rebuttals 
 
Metz objects to the relational view with a flurry of counterexamples regarding 
activities that grant one meaning in life but fail to involve any external connection:  
 
Consider that the following could in principle make one’s life somewhat 
more meaningful: publicly standing by what one reflectively believes to 
be right, exhibiting courage and performing a difficult act because it is 
right, being true to oneself, overcoming addiction, not letting oneself be 
bossed around, discovering new particles and confirming the existence 
of certain laws of nature. Since integrity, virtue, authenticity, autonomy, 
self-respect, and knowledge are internal to a person, or at least do not 
essentially involve a relationship to an external final good, and since they 
are prima facie candidates for a meaningful life, the concept of a 
meaningful life cannot just be that of an existence that has ‘a connection 
with an external value’ (Metz 2013: 29). 
 
However, it seems that these sorts of examples could plausibly be construed as 
giving meaning because of a linkage to an outward good even if they do not 
necessarily involve an external connection. For example, in the case of scientific 
discoveries, they could be meaningful because they are explanations that connect 
with what the world is really like, that is, they accurately represent the “facts” of 
the physical world (Kim 1988: 225). Nozick’s own tracking theory of knowledge 
is similar to this picture: “Knowledge is a particular way of being connected to 
the world, having a specific real factual connection to the world: tracking it” 
(Nozick 1981: 178). Additionally, externally connecting to facts is the sort of thing 
that confers meaning on Nozick’s view. He writes, “For a life to have meaning, it 
must connect with other things, with some things or values beyond 
itself…Tracking, either of facts or of value, is a mode of being so connected, as 
is fitting an external purpose” (emphasis mine) (Nozick 1981: 594-595). 
Or in the case of possessing virtues, agents may live meaningful lives qua 
virtuous because they link up to an objective moral reality that counts virtues like 
justice and courage as objective goods. For instance, if one were to do as Nozick 
does and seriously consider how a Platonic account might interact with the 
relational view, then one could say that to be virtuous is to participate in the Form 
of the Good (Nozick 1981: 595). This is the form that for Plato was the ultimate 
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grounding of truth and virtue which gave the other forms, such as justice, their 
goodness (Santas 1989: 144). Being virtuous through connecting oneself to the 
Form of the Good would presumably be an external link given that it is an entity 
we should distinguish “from everything else” (Republic VII.534b), is 
“independent of any desires, attitudes, or interest a sentient being may take in it” 
(Santas 1985: 239), and described as something whose “remoteness…is a 
metaphorical version of the thesis that value is not in the world…” (McDowell 
1979: 347).  
In other words, under the present realist analysis, what makes actions 
meaningful like acquiring scientific knowledge or living virtuously is that the 
agent engages with something outside himself—in this instance, facts of the world 
and objective values, respectively. And we do not think this is an implausible view. 
In fact, it seems that one of the main motivations for holding a realism about any 
given X (realism conceived of as linking to the “really real”) is that such a stance 
provides a kind of significance and motivation to the pursuit of X that could be 
characterized as giving meaning to it.5 Thus, the relational notion of connecting 
to something else that has value seems flexible enough to adequately characterize 
many of Metz’s counterexamples as meaningful through external linkage.  
Metz does offer more difficult counterexamples against the relational account 
which are harder to construe as making external connection in producing meaning. 
These are supernaturalist accounts where “a person’s life is meaningful insofar as 
she honours her soul or realizes what she essentially is qua spiritual substance 
endowed with a freedom independent of the laws of nature” (Metz 2013: 29). 
Since on these ultra-mundane frameworks a person’s soul seems very much 
internal to individuals and engagement solely with the soul seems conceptually 
capable of making life meaningful, such cases are more challenging for the 
relational theory to explain.  
We think these are better counterexamples. However, in giving the relational 
view a run for its money, it still might plausibly account for the dynamics of 
meaning in instances of honoring one’s soul or realizing one’s spiritual substance. 
                                                     
5 For an example of the phenomenon I am describing here, see Michele Moody-Adams’s criticism of 
Richard Rorty’s claim that the pursuit of justice needs no referent outside our own desires: “Could the 
student or the freedom rider engage in these activities [for justice], if they accepted Rorty’s view? Rorty 
wants to say they could and that all you need is solidarity, I want to say that that’s just nonsense…I think 
that you need the idea that at some point human moral inquiry could be progressing closer and closer to 
the grasp of an objective truth. Could be, but not necessarily is. You need that aspiration, you need that 
hope in order to be able to carry out the activity” (Moody-Adams 1998: 131).  
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To start, one might take Metz’s notion of meaning gained through realizing one’s 
higher nature as a form of self-knowledge, that is inquiring into the self (i.e. 
knowing the self’s nature)—this can be conceived of as “self-awareness [which] 
yields a grasp of the material or non-material nature of the self” (Gertler 2020). 
This sort of self-knowledge would involve propositions as its object, namely 
propositions concerning the true nature of the self.  
Thus, in the case of realizing one’s ensouled nature, let p be the proposition 
that one is a soul with freedom independent of the laws of nature and let q be 
someone who is a soul endowed with a freedom independent of the laws of nature. 
Thus, if q gains meaning through realizing p, q gains propositional knowledge of 
p. But propositional knowledge stands in a relation to the knower; indeed, the idea 
of a relation holding between knower and proposition is typically seen as a basic 
feature of attributions of propositional knowledge (Blaauw and Pritchard 2005: 
119; Hornsby 2005).6 Moreover, the connection between p and q can be credibly 
construed as an external relationship. A soul is not typically thought of as 
composed of propositions, particularly under substance dualism (Moreland 1987) 
or the Platonic doctrine of the soul as a metaphysically simple entity (van Inwagen 
2002: 171; Phaedo 78b-80e) (i.e. propositions are not substances nor are 
metaphysical simples composed of propositional parts).7 In other words, under 
the framework at play, propositions are external to souls, even if the latter 
incorporates the former, such as with a mind intaking propositional content. 
Alternatively, under a traditional knowledge/reality divide, propositions, as 
contents of statements, are representations while souls are things to be 
represented—they are distinct things (Kim 1988: 225).  
Accordingly, it seems plausible to say that p is external to q, and so when q 
accrues meaning via p, q does so by making an external connection outside q. To 
be clear, we do not necessarily hold the assumptions and commitments put forth 
                                                     
6 For a (somewhat) dissenting perspective, see Fodor (1978), for whom propositional attitudes are 
relational, but to say that “propositional attitudes are relations to propositions” is unclear since this 
relation must be mediated by internal representation (see especially p. 520).  
7 One might respond by saying that propositions may somehow be located within oneself so that when 
one realizes one’s spiritual substance, one is internally connecting. However, the notion of internality 
and externality we are using in this instance centers not around location but composition. A pacemaker 
may be internal to the body but is compositionally external to it, based on the usual conception of 
composition that a thing’s component parts must be of the same category of the thing which they 
compose (Lowe 2002: 236). However, if one makes a case for how propositions are in the same 
ontological category as souls or that the former can compose the latter, then Metz’s supernaturalist 
counterexamples would gain persuasiveness. 
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here, such as the claim that propositions must be external to souls. Instead, what 
we offer is a possible framework through which the relational theory could rebut 
the soul-based accounts of meaning in life that Metz suggests are ways of gaining 
meaning without going outside oneself. To summarize, the counterargument to 
Metz is the following:  
 
1. If q acquires meaning via p, then q connects to p. 
2. Propositions (such as p) are not internal to souls (such as q).  
3. Thus, if q acquires meaning via p, then q connects externally to p.  
 
4. Metz’s Objections—Expanding on the Counterexamples 
 
Having laid out some disagreements and possible replies to several of Metz’s 
counterexamples, we do think that other objections he presents to the relational 
account are much stronger. For example, he writes, “Conceiving of meaning as 
merely a function of connection with something external is not sufficient to 
capture the evaluative dimension of meaning, and, more generally, does not 
express anything fairly exclusive to meaning in life” (Metz 2013: 28). It is this 
last bit about the deficient generality of the relational theory that we find 
compelling. If meaning in life just is that phenomenon which results when one 
connects to value, it is unclear what work the relational theory of meaning is doing. 
Value talk (and other variations) seem able to do all the conceptual work that 
relational meaning is supposed to perform. In discussing the good life, if one 
speaks of connecting to value and another speaks of connecting to value which is 
also accompanied by meaning, the latter notion does not seem to add any salient 
dimension to the conversation—nothing seems to be lost by dropping talk of 
meaning.  
In other words, making meaning in life as generic as connecting to value 
makes meaning superfluous. Other concepts can easily fulfill the light theoretical 
responsibilities that meaning is supposed to handle. For example, consider 
Stephen Darwall’s discussion of human welfare, where in the spirit of Aristotelian 
eudaimonia, he claims “that a person’s welfare is enhanced, her life is made better 
for her, through active engagement with and appreciation of values whose worth 
transcends their capacity to benefit (extrinsically or intrinsically)” (Darwall 2002: 
76). He goes on to say that “the most beneficial human life consists of activities 
involving the appreciation of worth and merit” (Darwall 2002: 80). Pleasures such 
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as musical performance or parenting are important to our welfare because 
“through them, we are connecting with things that matter. The benefit comes 
through the appreciation of agent-neutral values—worth and merit—with which 
these activities connect us” (Darwall 2002: 95).  
It is hard to ignore the fact that Darwall’s notion of welfare is almost identical 
to Nozick’s relational theory of meaning. Both center on non-trivially connecting 
with things of value (and most of Darwall’s examples of welfare-endowing 
connections can be seen as external linkages). But if the idea of welfare (or 
eudaimonia as Darwall likens welfare to) can perform the same type of theoretical 
work in pursuing the good life that meaning claims for itself, then there seems to 
be little philosophical room left for the relational notion of meaning in life as 
engaged, external connection to a wider context of value. It is this weakness that 
we take to be the central merit of Metz’s objection that the relational account 
“does not express anything fairly exclusive to meaning in life” (Metz 2013: 28). 
Introducing concepts in value theory with non-unique capabilities are apt to be 
redundancies of limited use in theorizing the good life.  
Metz’s more central criticism against the relational theory is its inability to 
account for prominent subjectivist conceptions of meaning in life, such as the one 
proposed by Richard Taylor where what matters for a meaningful life is the 
satisfaction of one’s desires (Taylor 1970). Using the ancient Greek myth of 
Sisyphus who is condemned by the gods to roll a stone up a hill ad infinitum, 
Taylor says that if the gods were to inject in Sisyphus the voracious desire to roll 
stones up hills, then Sisyphus’ life would have meaning because he would be 
doing exactly what he wants to do with his life. On Taylor’s view, the meaning of 
life is to do whatever it is that we have a deep and abiding interest to fulfill. Metz 
says that Taylor’s desire-satisfaction subjectivism has been quite influential and 
extensively discussed, “probably the most widely reprinted and read discussion 
of the meaning of life in the past 40 years” (Metz 2013: 31). Because of this, the 
weakness of the relational view is that its concept of meaning simply must deny 
that Taylor’s view even counts as a theory of meaning in life since on his desire-
satisfaction framework, agents accrue meaning without connecting with anything 
beyond themselves. Metz concludes that it “is difficult to rest content with an 
analysis that entails that the many who consider Taylor’s theory to be about 
meaning are conceptually confused” (Metz 2013: 31). 
Although we do not hold this specific criticism that Metz makes, we do agree 
with his broader critique that Taylor’s subjectivism poses a problem for the 
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relational view since desire-satisfaction illuminates how external connection does 
not quite capture the definitive features of meaning in life. Our novel version of 
the objection is simple. Imagine that the gods rescind their punishment and instead 
implant in Sisyphus the deep desire to simply do nothing, from which he will 
experience immense pleasure (or happiness). Consequently, Sisyphus lies down 
unconscious for some time at the top of the mountain and experiences great 
pleasure and satisfaction from his total inaction. In other words, he connects to 
nothing external in his blissful idleness (call this Sisyphus 1). Now consider 
Nozick’s experience machine where one can plug into a contraption to simulate 
any assortment of desirable and pleasurable events for as long as one wants 
(Nozick 1974: 42-45). This would be connecting with something valuable outside 
oneself, since the machine is external to the individual. And this is not just any 
type of value but plausibly intrinsic or final value, as pleasure is widely 
categorized as such among hedonists and non-hedonists alike (Goldstein 1989: 
273; Hurka 2001; Feldman 2004: 31; Goetz 2012: 14; Metz 2013: 29). 8 
Furthermore, imagine that in this alternate world, Sisyphus 2 climbs down from 
the mountain and temporarily hooks up to the experience machine, encountering 
the same magnitude of pleasurable/happy fulfillment he experiences in the case 
of desire-satisfaction from complete idleness.  
Before moving to the substance of the objection, it is worth pointing out that 
Nozick considers a lifetime committed to the experience machine as un-
meaningful, but not because the machine lacks value. He does think that there is 
value to the machine, if it is used limitedly.9 He writes the following:  
 
Notice that we have not said one should never plug in to such a machine, 
even temporarily. It might teach you things, or transform you in a way 
beneficial for your actual life later. It also might give you pleasures that 
                                                     
8 There is a distinction sometimes made between something having intrinsic value (value in itself) and 
final value (value for its own sake), with the former specifying the location or source of the value, while 
the latter refers to the object’s value as an end (Korsgaard 1983: 170). It seems that the concept of final 
value is the one that philosophers have generally found more important (Rønnow-Rasmussen 2015: 34), 
although some deem “intrinsic value” an appropriate reference to final value’s denotation (Kagan 1998: 
293; Zimmerman and Bradley 2019). In this paper, the terms “intrinsic value” and “final value” refer to 
Nozick’s idea of intrinsic value as the value something “has in itself apart from or independently of 
whatever it leads to or its further consequences” (Nozick 1981: 311).  
 
9 Whether he thinks the machine has intrinsic value is unclear since that would depend on its organic 
unity, Nozick’s measure of intrinsic value. A point in favor of its possessing intrinsic value, however, 
would be qua source of pleasure, arguably an intrinsic good. 
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would be quite acceptable in limited doses. This is all quite different from 
spending the rest of your life on the machine; the internal contents of that 
life would be unconnected to actuality” (Nozick 1989: 108).  
 
Herein lies the primary reason why Nozick rejects a lifetime hooked to the 
machine. Such an act privileges the value of pleasure in a way that makes no room 
for other values, most importantly, connecting to reality. He writes, “I am saying 
that the connection to actuality is important whether or not we desire it—that is 
why we desire it—and the experience machine is inadequate because it doesn’t 
give us that” (Nozick 1989: 107). In other words, a lifetime in the machine fails 
to connect to a “wider context of value,” one of the key aspects of a meaningful 
life on the relational view (Nozick 1981: 611). He goes on to say concerning a life 
solely constituted by pleasure and happiness, like the one the experience machine 
provides, that a “life cannot just be happy while having nothing else valuable in 
it” (Nozick 1989: 113).10 Although “[o]f course we wish people to have many 
such moments and days of happiness,” Nozick writes, “it is not clear that we want 
those moments constantly or want our lives to consist wholly and only of them” 
(Nozick 1989: 117). While pleasure is valuable, a life totally consumed by it is 
limited in meaning because such an existence is constrained regarding the 
diversity of value it can link with. 
Hence, on Nozick’s view, the experience machine is valuable in the sense that 
pleasure is a value that can appropriately be part of a meaningful life as long as 
other values (like linking to reality) are present. With this background, our 
contention is that the two scenarios of our Sisyphus counterexample indicate that 
connecting to value outside oneself is not what is fundamental for meaning in life. 
Under the relational theory, Sisyphus 2 accrues more meaning in life than 
Sisyphus 1 since the latter experiences value (pleasure) without external linkage 
while Sisyphus 2 connects to a machine outside himself in experiencing the value 
of pleasure. In fact, Sisyphus 1 gains no meaning whatsoever since no external 
connection with value is made. But are these implications plausible? Is the mere 
fact of external connection the decisive difference in the meaningfulness of the 
two lives? We think that the basic intuition here is that Sisyphus 1 and Sisyphus 2 
are more or less equivalent in overall meaningfulness (whether the degree is high 
or low). The mere fact that Sisyphus 2 involves an external relation in 
                                                     
10 Nozick doesn’t carefully distinguish between pleasure and happiness but seems to classify pleasure 
as a type of happiness (Nozick 1989: 108). 
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experiencing pleasure while Sisyphus 1 encounters the same sort of desire 
satisfaction absent linkage outside himself does not seem to be a decisive (or even 
relevant) factor in evaluating the meaningfulness of the two Sisyphuses. And if 
this is so, then external connection to value is not what is definitive for meaning 
in life, contra the relational account. 
Another way to put forward the basic intuition that undergirds our objection 
is this: many would consider meaning in life to be a highly desirable good. Now 
imagine if people were told that they must spend the rest of their lives either as 
Sisyphus 1 (pleasure without transcendent connection) or Sisyphus 2 (pleasure 
via the experience machine). Thus, if meaning is a great good and conceptually 
relational, then would not people have strong reason to prefer the experience 
machine over idle pleasure lacking external connection if the degree of pleasure 
is the same in both cases? It seems to us that people would not have an 
overwhelming preference for the experience machine option since it exhibits no 
greater virtue over the alternative, particularly in the dimension of meaning. Of 
course, there might be reason not to prefer either option but given a forced choice 
between the two, the fact that one scenario includes external connection and the 
other does not seems insufficient as an important, rational consideration to 
persuade either way. So if meaning in life is conceptually relational and generally 
considered a great good, but it is not consistently favored, then this gives some 
reason to believe that perhaps a relational understanding of meaning is not quite 
capturing what is necessary for it. Hence, we conclude that meaning as external 
connection to value does not adequately explain what is important for meaning in 
life. 
 
5. Meaning via Internal Connections: A Triune God 
 
In this section and the next, we attempt to provide a case of a life that is 
meaningful through solely internal connections, thus providing a counterexample 
to the relational view’s claim that for “a life to have meaning, it must connect with 
other things, with some things or values beyond itself” (Nozick 1981: 594).11 Our 
                                                     
11 Another deity-involved counterexample which we do not explore is positing that God just “glows 
meaning,” exactly the kind of explanation about which Nozick incredulously asks, “How in the world 
(or out of it) can there be something whose nature contains meaning, something which just glows 
meaning?” (1981: 593). Perhaps God has the Form of Meaning in the divine mind (i.e. meaning as an 
abstract object constituted by God’s thought) (Welty 2014: 81) so that God simply emanates meaning 
as part of the divine nature, making the meaning of God’s life an entirely non-external affair. Or maybe 
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first example is the Christian Trinity. Of course, many do not think that 
contemporary models of the Trinity are logically coherent or consistent with 
biblical and creedal formulations (Winter 2013; Tuggy 2016). However, our 
counterexample does not assume any one model of the Trinity nor its general 
coherence; rather, it supposes that the basic structure of the Trinity is coherent 
enough to speak of as one entity, formed by three persons, and which gains 
meaning through solely connecting with itself.12  
Before getting into the concept of the Trinity, we wish to make a few prefatory 
points. First, although we do not delve into what constitutes a person, we think 
that the three individuals of the Trinity fulfill most mainstream criteria for 
personhood. These include being “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and 
reflection, and can consider itself as itself” (Locke 1689/2017: 115), having a 
capacity for a “first-person perspective” (Baker 2000: 20), and possessing a will 
that is able to form “second-order desires” (i.e. desires for desires) (Frankfurt 
1971: 6-7). Second, despite the plurality of persons, we deem it coherent to 
conceive of a triune deity as a single being that can be characterized as having a 
unitary life. One way to think of this notion is through the mythological dog 
Cerberus who has three heads but is one biological organism (this is the 
illustration that William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland offer in explicating their 
“Trinity monotheism” model of the Christian God) (2017: 592). Similarly, one 
can speak of the Trinity having three persons but existing as one, united being, 
since the Godhead is a single “divine organism.” The members of the Trinity can 
also be thought of as a single life in being “necessarily united in their purposes 
and in their actions towards the world,” (Hasker 2013: 257) since the unity of 
one’s mind and intentions is often seen as central to living one life as opposed to 
several.13 In these ways, we deem it sensible to discuss the notion of meaning in 
the Trinity’s life, while also speaking of the relations among the persons as 
                                                     
God just creates meaning, like how God creates the world (although this particular case might run into 
the “bootstrapping objection” found in discussions of divine aseity where God might already need to 
possess a property, like meaningfulness, in order to create it) (Craig 2016: 60-61). At any rate, these 
sorts of scenarios at least seem conceptually possible and (mostly) unproblematic. There seems to be no 
obvious reason for a theist to reject them. However, we will not further pursue such an easy line of 
objection. 
12 This position is consistent with speaking of particular aspects of meaning in the life of each 
individual person of the Trinity as well.  
13 This is why those who display very different purposes and conduct in one setting as opposed to 
another are called “two-faced” (if they act with hypocrisy) or accused of living a “double life” (if certain 
elements of secrecy are involved).  
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“internal connections” (i.e. internal to the one life of the triune God).14  
The concept of the Trinity has historically been that there is one God made of 
three persons—Father, Son, and Spirit. The starting point for this idea comes from 
various Christian creeds, such as the Athanasian Creed (c. A.D. 500) which states, 
“Yet there are not three almighty beings; there is but one almighty being. Thus the 
Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. Yet there are not three gods; 
there is but one God.” Accordingly, Christian philosophers are generally united 
on this essential framework of the Trinity. For example, Michael Murray and 
Michael Rea state that “[f]rom the beginning, Christians have affirmed the claim 
that there is one God, and three persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—each of 
whom is God” (Murray and Rea 2016).15 Similarly, William Hasker writes, “Yet 
the question, ‘One what?’ also needs to be answered, if we are to have a satisfying 
answer to the metaphysical problem of the divine three-in-oneness. To be sure, 
the question can easily be answered, ‘One God,’ and all trinitarians will agree to 
that” (Hasker 2013: 50). In other words, the Trinity is three persons that integrate 
into one entity with a single existence, whether that three in one is conceived of 
as three properties of divine personhood with the same divine substance (Rea 
2009: 419), three centers of self-consciousness with one soul (Craig and Moreland 
2017: 593), or three divine individuals who jointly establish a collective, single 
source of the being of all else (Swinburne 1994: 180). For our purposes, it does 
not matter what precisely explains this three-in-oneness. All we need to establish 
is that the Trinity, at the very least, is one completely unified being that “is not a 
single person, but the closest possible union and communion of the three divine 
persons” (Hasker 2013: 258).  
Our claim is for the conceptual possibility of a triune God possessing a 
meaningful life via purely internal connections, without transcending outside 
Godself. 16  To begin, imagine that the members of the Trinity have always 
                                                     
14 As in the previously discussed case of propositions being external to souls in the sense of being 
compositionally external, the three persons of the Trinity are internally situated because they compose 
the Godhead. To reiterate, a simple notion of composition is that for x to compose y, x and y must be in 
the same ontological category. The three persons of the Trinity fulfill this criterion because they are of 
the same divine substance as the Trinity (at least according to most models of the Christian God). Hence, 
it is plausible to think that the act of one person of the Trinity relating to another, while external to the 
two, is internal to the one life of the Trinity. Here, the “one life” of the Trinity is understood by extending 
the notion of self to include multiple persons within a single being. 
15 For a dissenting view of the Trinity’s theological history, see Tuggy (2016).  
16 Although there is controversy over differentiating what is internal or external to God, particularly 
concerning abstract objects, we think that the examples we have chosen in this section of God’s 
meaningful life through solely internal connections are clearly divine aspects and relations internal to 
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intensely loved each other. In fact, this is an argument often given for a plurality 
of persons within the Godhead (Swinburne 1994: 190-191; Swinburne 2008: 28-
38; Craig and Moreland 2017: 593). It is claimed that since God is a perfect being, 
God must be essentially loving since love is a necessary attribute of a morally 
perfect being. Hence, there must be several divine persons for God to ceaselessly 
express this attribute of love. So if the Trinity has been in thoroughly loving 
relationships within the Godhead’s three persons since eternity past, it seems that 
a triune God’s enduring interactions of complete love is a viable possibility for at 
least a somewhat meaningful life. And this three-person love within the one God 
would be through solely internal connections, as prior to any creational act, God 
would be existing alone in all reality, with each member of the Trinity bestowing 
great love upon the other. Thus, we think that the notion of a triune God 
exclusively connecting internally through ceaselessly loving Godself through 
inter-relations of love within the Trinity is a “prima facie candidate” for a 
meaningful life (Metz 2013: 29). Accordingly, the relational account’s 
requirement that connections beyond oneself are needed for meaning seems 
inadequate for capturing what is at the heart of having a meaningful life.  
But perhaps one may be skeptical that the case of the Trinity is a strong 
counterexample to Nozick by virtue of the plurality of persons present in the 
scenario. One might say that the “one life” of the triune God accrues meaning 
externally because the divine persons obtain meaning outside themselves. While 
we have tried to emphasize that it is from the perspective of the one Godhead that 
the connections to value are internal (not from the perspective of any individual 
divine person, where linkages will be external), we present another variety of 
meaning via internality for those yet unpersuaded.  
 
6. Meaning via Internal Connections: An Aristotelian God 
 
Imagine that instead of the Trinity, Aristotle’s “most good” deity is the one 
who reigns supreme (Metaphysics 1072b30). For Aristotle, this is the sort of 
individual who does nothing but contemplate Godself since the divine is the most 
excellent thing to direct one’s thoughts, and to contemplate anything else would 
be to engage in a less-than-perfect activity (Steenberghen 1974: 557; Craig 1980: 
35). In fact, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle cites God’s rational activity as 
                                                     
God (e.g. interrelations among the members of the Trinity), and so we hope to sidestep the 
aforementioned debate (Craig 2016: 81-82).  
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the standard for human flourishing: “Therefore the activity of God, which 
surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human 
activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of 
happiness” (X.1178b21-24). Furthermore, he says concerning this act of divine 
contemplation that “it must be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most 
excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking” (Metaphysics 
XII.1074b33-34). 
It is of course difficult to know exactly what Aristotle speaks of with the 
phrase “thinking on thinking,” but suppose that God’s contemplation here is 
utterly simple, non-relational, and unconnected to propositional knowledge 
(Beere 2010: 27). In this sort of scenario, we deem an Aristotelian God as still 
being able to have a meaningful life solely through this type of contemplative 
internal connection. Suppose the deity’s eternal self-contemplation is the most 
excellent expression of reason imaginable while also being highly pleasurable. It 
seems that this type of divine life is not incapable of meaning, as it would fulfill 
many traditional conceptions of meaning in life which stipulate activities such as 
intense engagement with rationality or experiencing great pleasure as sufficient 
for meaning. At any rate, what we hope to have shown is that it is difficult to 
characterize an Aristotelian God’s life as deficient in meaning simply because the 
deity’s connections to value are internal instead of external. If the difficulty looms 
large enough, then our counterexample should persuade those partial to the 
relational theory to reconsider whether external linkage to value is necessary for 
meaning in life.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
In summary, we think that although the relational account is more resistant to 
some of Metz’s counterexamples, it is less resilient against others and the 
variations of them that we have developed in this paper, particularly our 
subjectivist example of Sisyphus 1 and 2. It also seems that life could be 
meaningful through solely internal relations, such as a triune God’s existence of 
love only among the persons of one Godhead living a single life or an Aristotelian 
deity’s perpetually exercising rational self-contemplation. As said at the outset, it 
is the idea of external connection being needed for meaning that this paper 
disputes. Now, all this does not mean that the relational theory has nothing to offer 
regarding how to best grasp meaning in life. For instance, one could take Metz’s 
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suggestion that perhaps “meaning can be essentially relational without being 
exhaustively relational” (Metz 2016: 1252). In other words, the relational theory 
could explain how meaning increases through one’s reaching beyond oneself 
while not limiting all avenues of meaning to external connections. This is quite 
possible, especially when considering the fact that most paradigmatic examples 
of meaning-making, like family relationships or aiding the poor, involve relating 
to entities beyond oneself. What looks less attractive, though, is the idea that 
transcendence beyond oneself toward a wider context of value is all there is to 
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